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Constructing Systemic Safeguards
Against Informant Perjury
Peter A. Joy*
Reliance on an informant's testimony as the primary basis for charging and
convicting the accused is fraught with problems. While the hypothetical explicitly
addresses the ethical dilemmas defense counsel faces when her client is trading
false testimony in exchange for a reduced charge and shorter sentence, the
hypothetical also implicitly illustrates the inadequacies of our criminal justice
system's current handling of testimony from cooperating witnesses.
The focus on the ethical, and perhaps moral, obligations of Lawyer
representing a potentially perjurious Client begs larger questions. Are there
safeguards the prosecutor's office could employ to ensure that the trial prosecutor,
who is focused on convicting Kingpin, has not been manipulated by Client or has
not consciously or unconsciously supplied the facts necessary for Client to
manufacture the testimony required to convict Kingpin? What criminal justice
reforms would help to prevent or discredit such perjury and make a wrongful
conviction less likely? These are some of the additional questions we should be
exploring. In my comment, I first illustrate why focusing solely on defense
counsel ethics is not wholly sufficient and next briefly discuss some criminal
justice system reforms that would better safeguard the accused.
I. WHY WE SHOULD Focus ON THE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND NOT SOLELY DEFENSE
COUNSEL
That Kingpin is set-up to be convicted based on false testimony is almost
inevitable given the way the criminal justice system currently operates, and solely
focusing on the ethical obligations of defense counsel will not reliably prevent or
remedy perjury in most instances. In order to understand how this happens, let us
briefly review some of the facts in the hypothetical.
Client, who is charged with transporting heroin into the United States, knows
that she will likely be convicted and receive a long prison term. Lawyer tells
Client that if she has any information about Kingpin or others involved in the
crime she may be able to reduce her sentence considerably. Under current federal
law this could change the sentence for transporting heroin, which carries a penalty
of ten years to life for a defendant without a prior felony conviction, to a charge of
drug possession and a sentence of less than two years in prison. This huge
sentence reduction creates an enormous incentive for Client to accuse Kingpin
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falsely, particularly where the U.S. Attorney's Office is eager to make a case
against Kingpin.
With a prosecutor's office focused on convicting Kingpin and Client focused
on minimizing her prison sentence, should Lawyer have told Client about the
possibility of reducing her sentence by cooperating? At least one federal district
court has said that it is ineffective assistance for a defense lawyer not to have such
a discussion,' and many defense lawyers would view such a discussion as
necessary for the competent representation of Client even if they were not
concerned with ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Client offers to testify against Kingpin, and the prosecutor agrees to reduce
the charge against Client so that she will receive a much shorter sentence provided
her cooperation is truthful. While other commentators will more thoroughly
analyze what Lawyer may, should, or must do in response to Client's revelation
that her testimony against Kingpin will be "all lies," the following overview of the
issues demonstrates that many of the options open to a defense lawyer may do little
to stop an informant's perjury.
Lawyer's duty of loyalty to Client underlies the very strong presumption that
Lawyer will maintain confidentiality about Client's planned perjury. Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.6 reflects this strong preference for client confidentiality
over competing interests by permitting, but not requiring, Lawyer to "reveal
information relating to the representation" of Client if Lawyer believes it necessary
to prevent Client from committing the crime of perjury and the possible resulting
wrongful conviction and incarceration of Kingpin.2 Most jurisdictions follow
Model Rule 1.6. Even if one argues that Lawyer "should" take steps that may
include revealing Client's planned perjury (or actual perjury if one argues that
Lawyer should wait to see if Kingpin is convicted), Lawyer is not ethically
compelled to do so under Model Rule 1.6.
Model Rule 3.3, Candor toward the Tribunal, supersedes the obligation to
protect confidentiality found in Model Rule 1.6 in some situations, however.
Under Model Rule 3.3(b), Lawyer has an obligation to "take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal" if Lawyer "knows"
that Client intends to commit perjury in "an adjudicative proceeding" in which
Lawyer represents Client.3 For Model Rule 3.3 to apply, Lawyer must represent
Client when Client testifies as a witness in Kingpin's trial, and Lawyer must know
Client is going to lie. Even if we assume that Lawyer believes she has the requisite
actual knowledge that Client will commit perjury, Model Rule 3.3(b)'s
I United States v. Fernandez, No. 98 CR. 961 JSM., 2000 WL 534449 (S.D.N.Y. May 3,
2000), adhered to on reconsideration, No. 98 CR. 961 JSM., 2000 WL 815913 (S.D.N.Y. June 22,
2000).
2 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009).
3 Id. at R. 3.3(b).
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applicability is not clear because we do not know that Lawyer will represent Client
at Kingpin's trial.4
Some may argue that Lawyer should, or is required to, seek to withdraw from
representing Client, 5 but withdrawal is unlikely to stop the perjury. If one argues
that Lawyer should inform the court of the planned perjury, does that solve the
problem? Not necessarily, because the judge could determine that the jury will
decide Client's credibility. If Lawyer is also willing to testify for Kingpin's
defense to impeach Client, would that solve the perjury problem? Again, we
cannot be confident that the judge in Kingpin's trial would permit such
impeachment if Client asserted a claim of attorney-client privilege, even though
one may argue that the conversation falls under the crime-fraud exception to
attorney-client privilege.
If we assume Lawyer could derail or remedy Client's planned perjury in some
way, what about the countless cases in which cooperating witnesses do not admit
to their lawyers that they plan to commit perjury to achieve a significant sentence
reduction? What safeguards exist to prevent another defendant facing a possible
life sentence from "volunteering" to testify for the government against Kingpin
with manufactured testimony calculated to convict?
As this brief summary of the issues suggests, more satisfactory resolutions to
the underlying issue posed by the hypothetical require looking into how to prevent,
make less likely, or more effectively counteract a cooperating witness testifying
falsely in the first place.
II. COUNTERACTING THE PROSECUTOR'S TUNNEL VISION TO CONVICT
The unreliability of cooperating witnesses such as Client is well-recognized.
More than fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court warned that
"informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other betrayals
which are 'dirty business' may raise serious questions of credibility."6 As Judge
Stephen Trott, a former Associate Attorney General sitting on the Ninth Circuit,
explained:
Never has it been more true than it is now that a criminal charged
with a serious crime understands that a fast and easy way out of trouble
with the law is ... to cut a deal at someone else's expense and to purchase
4 If Lawyer does not represent Client in Kingpin's trial, Lawyer faces another Model Rule
3.3 dilemma if Lawyer continues to represent Client at the plea and sentencing in her own case
because her plea agreement relies on Client's cooperation against Kingpin. Model Rule 3.3(a) states
that, "A lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." Id. at
R. 3.3(a).
6 Id. atR. 1. 16.6 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952).
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leniency from the government by offering testimony in return for
immunity, or in return for reduced incarceration.
.. Defendants or suspects with nothing to sell sometimes embark on
a methodical journey to manufacture evidence and to create something of
value, setting up and betraying friends, relatives, and cellmates alike.
Judge Trott also warned prosecutors that informants would do anything to get
out of trouble with the law, including "lying, committing perjury, manufacturing
evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more lies, and double-
crossing anyone with whom they come into contact," and they "are remarkably
manipulative and skillfully devious. Many are outright conscienceless sociopaths
to whom 'truth' is a wholly meaningless concept." 8
Although the prosecutor may understand the risk of a cooperating witness
manufacturing evidence in the abstract, in Kingpin's case the prosecutor wants to
believe Client because the prosecutor enters the room to talk with Client already
certain that Kingpin is guilty. There are a number of psychological impediments
the prosecutor faces, including tunnel vision, which may make the prosecutor a
poor judge of Client's credibility.9
To counteract the prosecutor's likely predisposition to believe Client, there
need to be more controls on the use of informant testimony. Presently, the justice
system relies on the prosecutor to make an initial credibility judgment, the defense
to test the testimony through cross-examination at trial, and the jury as fact-fmder
to determine whether to believe the testimony. As data from DNA exonerations
demonstrate, these are often insufficient safeguards. In sixteen percent of the more
than 250 exonerations, testimony from cooperating witnesses, such as Client, were
the basis for or contributed to the wrongful convictions.10
Realizing the need for more safeguards when using informants, in 2005 the
American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates passed a resolution calling
on federal, state, and local governments to adopt measures so "no prosecution
7 Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
8 Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1383 (1996).
9 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587 (2006) (arguing that confirmation bias, selective
information processing, belief perseverance, and avoidance of cognitive dissonance impede
prosecutor decision making); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291 (analyzing how tunnel vision-focusing on
a particular suspect-affects all phases of criminal proceedings); Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About
Justice from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt
and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847 (2002) (exploring how tunnel vision leads to
constructing guilt based on unreliable informants).
10 The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/35 l.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
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should occur based solely upon uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony."'"1
As the ABA notes in its report accompanying the resolution, the prosecutor is
"[t]he first check (and perhaps the most important) on unreliable testimony by
informants."' 2 But psychological experiments demonstrate that "as a general rule,
people are poor human lie detectors."'
' 3
To help guard against the psychological impediments prosecutors face and to
guarantee greater reliability in making credibility decisions at every stage of using
informant testimony, there needs to be "a greater degree of transparency, oversight,
and neutrality into the process."' 4  Here are some reforms that should be
implemented.
A. Require More Transparency
As a starting point, state and federal criminal discovery rules should be
amended to require prosecutors to disclose more to the defense concerning
informants. Prosecutors should be required to disclose all of the information
corroborating the witness's testimony as well as any information that may be used
to possibly impeach the informant, such as all benefits the informant is receiving
for her testimony, inconsistent statements, and whether the informant has testified
for the government in other cases.
Legislatures should also enact laws requiring law enforcement officers and
prosecutors to videotape all conversations with the informant, and to disclose the
tapes to the defense for possible impeachment use,
... so that there is the ability, after the fact, to determine if the witness
has been coached into inculpating the accused, or if the witness has
manipulated the police or prosecutor into disclosing details of the crime
known only to the victim, the real perpetrator, and involved law
enforcement officials.'5
" ABA Res. 108(b), adopted by the House of Delegates (Feb. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/aba-108b.pdf.
12 Id.
13 Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident but
Erroneous, 23 CARDozO L. REv. 809, 809 (2002). "Dozens of studies of the communication of
deception provide compelling evidence that people are not very skilled at distinguishing when others
are lying from when they are telling the truth. In experimental studies of detecting deception,
accuracy is typically only slightly better than chance." Bella M. DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-
Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception, 1 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 346,
346 (1997).
14 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, JAILHOUSE SNITCH TEsTImoNY: A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2007),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Death-penalty-reform/Jailhouse
%20snitch%20testimony/o2Opolicy%20brief.pdf.
15 Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 619, 639-40 (2007).
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For cross-examination by the defense to be an effective tool to test credibility,
there must be more transparency concerning the promises made to the informant,
how the informant may have been coached, and how the informant may have
manipulated the prosecutor to shape the testimony against the accused.
B. Require More Oversight
There needs to be more oversight within the prosecutor's office of the use of
informants. A prosecutor or team of prosecutors not involved in the case should
review all of the recordings of interviews of the informant and all corroborating
evidence to make the credibility determination in order to provide an internal
check. 16 In evaluating the informant's testimony, the reviewing prosecutors should
require corroborative evidence that, independent of the informant's testimony and
the testimony of other informants, connects the accused to the crime. As Judge
Trott advocates, the prosecutors making the credibility determination must
"[c]heck out everything your witness says. Look for documentary evidence,
corroborating witnesses, prior consistent statements---everything. If he says he
made an important telephone call, bring in the phone company records. If he says
he was in Las Vegas, prove it independently of what he says with hotel clerks and
records."17
C. Require More Neutrality
The ultimate decision of whether to admit informant testimony against the
accused should not be made solely by the prosecutor, a partisan advocate, but
should also involve the trial judge. Juries also should have more information to
evaluate the credibility of informants. Both of these safeguards are attainable, and
both require some changes in the criminal justice system.
Judges should become involved in evaluating the credibility of an informant's
testimony to determine if it is reliable enough to be presented to the jury. Existing
evidence law provides some basis for judges taking a more active role in
monitoring the use of informants through the use of pretrial reliability hearings.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: "Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness.., or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the court,"' 8 and "[h]earings on ... preliminary matters shall be
so conducted when the interests of justice require."' 19 In addition, Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 provides that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
16 Id. at 640.
1 Trott, supra note 8, at 1407.
18 FED. R. Evn. 104(a).
"9 Id. at 104(c).
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substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury. ' 20
Given the many problems of false informant testimony, such as those revealed
by the analysis of DNA exonerations, there is a strong basis for trial judges to
require reliability hearings. As one judge has argued, "to ensure the utmost
reliability in the admission of jailhouse informant testimony, I would.., mandate
the reliability hearing.' In order to ensure that all judges conduct such hearings,
states and the federal government should adopt rules to require reliability hearings
whenever-the government promises the informant in exchange for testimony
something of value, such as a reduced charge, more lenient sentence, or money.
22
For the jury to be an adequate neutral check on admitted informant testimony,
the jury needs more information to determine credibility effectively. This requires
special jury instructions. The jury should be instructed to consider promises made
to the informant, the informant's prior criminal record, whether the informant has
testified for the government in prior cases, whether the informant has made any
statements inconsistent with the testimony at trial, and any other factors that may
render the testimony unreliable.
III. CONCLUSION
As this brief comment on the issues presented by the hypothetical suggests,
more satisfactory resolutions to the underlying problem require both looking into
how to prevent, or at least make less likely, cooperating witnesses testifying falsely
in the first place and minimizing the weight given to false testimony when it is
admitted. Some of the recommended reforms to achieve these goals, such as
amending the discovery rules, requiring the taping of law enforcement
conversations with informants, and providing more detailed jury instructions have
already been adopted in whole or part by some jurisdictions. Similarly, some
prosecutors' offices have implemented more oversight in evaluating informant
testimony, and some courts have ordered reliability hearings before admitting
informant testimony. These are achievable reforms that, although they may not
always prevent false testimony, would better protect the accused if a defense
lawyer is unable to stop a client from testifying falsely. And, in the numerous
situations where informants do not reveal to their defense attorneys that they intend
to lie on the stand, the reforms would provide prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges,
and juries with more tools to exclude, counteract, or disregard the lies.
20 Id. at 403.
21 Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 785 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (Strubhar, P.J., concurring).
22 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 14, at 2, 5.
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